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    Abstract      
The design (or evaluation) of military aircraft,
by nature, is a process consisting of conflicting goals
and objectives at the conceptual, preliminary, and
detailed level.  Affordability, mission capability,
availability (operational readiness), wartime
survivability, and peacetime safety are five of the main
attributes required of modern weapon systems.
Traditional approaches for system evaluation or
optimization have focused on one, perhaps two, of these
attributes in isolation.  At Georgia Tech's Aerospace
Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL), a methodology
has been developed which takes account of the combined
effect of each of the "-ilities" plus safety in providing a
means to evaluate alternative designs.  The centerpiece
of this approach is the Overall Evaluation Criterion
(OEC).  The OEC is an equation consisting of five
metrics; one for each of the attributes.  These five terms
are pre-multiplied by so-called attribute importance
coefficients which represent the ability to tailor the
OEC to the evaluator's preferences.  The purpose of this
paper is to detail the form of this OEC, describe the
appropriate metrics for each of the five attributes which
make up the criterion, illustrate an algorithm for their
concurrent calculation, and conclude by suggesting a
novel way of quantifying an evaluation by accounting
for the "voice of the customer".
    Nomenclature
Ai = Inherent Availability
IPPD = Integrated Process and Product Development
LCC = Life Cycle Cost
MCI = Mission Capability Index
MTBF = Mean Time Between Failure
MTTR = Mean Time To Repair
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PD = Probability of Detection
PH/D = Probability of Hit if Detected
PK/H = Probability of Kill if Hit
Psurv = Probability of Survival
EAI = Engine Attrition Index
O&S = Operations and Support cost
OEC = Overall Evaluation Criterion
PI = Productivity Index
Ps = Specific Excess Power
RDTE = Research, Design, Development, & Test
k = mission capability weighting factor
α = affordability importance coefficient
β = mission capability importance coefficient
γ = operational safety importance coefficient
δ = survivability importance coefficient
ε = readiness importance coefficient
  Introduction   
The definition of a "good" overall design for a
military weapon system almost always depends on one's
point of view.  From a performance standpoint, a
necessary requirement for an advanced multirole strike
aircraft, for example, is a significant ground attack
capability in the form of delivering a maximum payload
to a target at an appropriate range as well as some air-
to-air capability at certain Mach-altitude combinations.
The resulting size and geometry of such an aircraft,
however, may result in a poor level of survivability due
to increases in radar and infrared signature.  Further,
passive improvements in these signatures may
dramatically drive up the aircraft cost.  The recognition
of these tradeoffs is not difficult; it is, however, not
trivial to capture and quantify them for the purposes of
design and/or evaluation.  It is for this reason that the
methodology described herein was constructed.  
The paper is constructed in the same order as
one would execute the methodology described.  First,
the task to be accomplished is defined and value
objectives are formulated.  Then, feasible alternatives
are either evaluated (if they already exist) or generated
for new designs based on these objectives and mission
requirements.  These alternatives are then evaluated
against each other via the Overall Evaluation Criterion.
Finally, a summary flowchart of the approach is
presented along with concluding remarks.
2
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
    Decomposition:  Establish the Objective   
The methodology development task was first
approached from a system level viewpoint.  What
attributes contribute to weapon system effectiveness?
Previous studies have considered such elements as
payload / range capability, maneuverability, signatures,
and operating cost to name a few.  In fact, most of these
studies have evaluated system effectiveness by
accounting for these elements in isolation.  The
approach taken presently is based on the idea that the
only way to measure or evaluate total system
effectiveness is through an    overall     evaluation     criterion
which captures or addresses all key elements.  In
essence, the desired criterion function must allow the
designer or the evaluator to ask and answer such
questions about a set of feasible configurations as:  
• How much does it cost to manufacture,
operate, and maintain this system(s) ?
• Can this aircraft deliver sufficient payload to
target ?  Is an increased-range variant possible ?
• What are the differences in maneuverability
between the candidate configurations?
• What are the relative operational availability
levels?  What is the reliability of each aircraft?
• How survivable are the candidates?
• What are the corresponding peacetime attrition
rates?
The consideration of these questions calls for  a
breakdown of weapon system effectiveness into
appropriate headings.  It was decided that a scheme
similar to the one advocated by the Defense Systems
Management College (DSMC) would be used to address
such questions.  Therefore, the detailed DSMC system
effectiveness breakdown structure found in Reference 1
was studied and subsequently modified with the
inclusion of affordability to better represent the scope of
today's weapon system procurement environment.  This
modified decomposition provides for a more natural
means of implementation when the time comes to
perform actual analysis.  This breakdown for a military
aircraft appears in Figure 1.
Weapon System Effectiveness





















       defects
•  Design defects
Figure 1:  Weapons System Effectiveness Chart
 With this breakdown in hand, one can begin
to form ideas as to how best to evaluate the "goodness"
of competing configurations.  Before any evaluative
task is undertaken, however, whether it be an
optimization or series of point design evaluations, an
objective function needs to be defined.  Objective
functions are usually mathematical representations of a
physical phenomenon which are desired to be studied.
For strike aircraft, as an example, a common objective
function might be range for a given payload.  For an air
superiority aircraft, its maneuverability characteristics
would be a more appropriate measure of comparison.
Many times, however, a discipline specific function is
neither desired nor appropriate, and a purely physical
objective function which represents the total weapon
system merit is not available.  Instead, an inclusive
criterion is needed to accurately capture the correlation
between component characteristics and System
Effectiveness.  Therefore, such an inclusive function can
be formulated and simply referred to as the Overall
Evaluation Criterion.
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Given that the general attributes of a weapon
system appropriate for the criterion function have been
identified (Fig. 1), a formal expression for this OEC is
developed.  This is accomplished through the use of
discipline metrics.  A metric is a means of transforming
a set of dependent variables into a standardized statistic
so that multiple dependent variables can be investigated
and evaluated simultaneously.2  The five major






As such, the general form of the OEC is as follows:
   
OEC = α(Affordability) + β(Capability) + 
γ(Operational Safety) + δ(Survivability) +
ε(Readiness)              (1)
The OEC is then formally defined by selecting
five discipline metrics, each of which represents one of
the five key attributes.  The α, β, γ, δ, and ε are the
aforementioned attribute importance coefficients and
must always sum to unity.  These coefficients provide
the ability to tailor the OEC to specific needs,
preferences, or points of view of a customer.  In other
words, given one dollar, the coefficients indicate how
the evaluator would want to distribute that dollar.  The
focus now turns toward developing the five discipline
metrics to complete the OEC.  
    Affordability
Affordability is measured by the Life Cycle
Cost (LCC) metric.  Since all newly proposed military
aircraft programs will most certainly be scrutinized with
regard to affordability, the aircraft designer must become
aware of how his decisions affect the economics of the
program.  In fact, if an affordable system is to be built,
the designer will have to account for economic
considerations from the conception of the program until
the retirement and disposal of the aircraft.  LCC can be
defined as the total cost to the government of
acquisition,  ownership, operation, and disposal of that
system over its full life.3  As such, it includes the
following: Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
(RDT&E); Production; Operation and Support (O&S);
and Retirement and Disposal.  The following equation
illustrates the terms that make up the Life Cycle Cost:
LCC = RDT&E + Procurement + O&S (2)
Although the general equation is simple, the make-up
of the component parts is quite detailed.  Many times it
is valuable to decompose a metric into its various sub-
models and input parameters.  This can be done via an
Ishikawa, or "Fishbone" Diagram, as seen in Figure 2.
The upper portion documents the top level costs which
appear in the equation.  The bottom charts the second
level costs (e.g. component, material cost).
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Figure 2:  Ishikawa Diagram for Life Cycle Cost
The Ishikawa Diagram helps illustrate that the
LCC will be influenced by Attrition Rate (attrition
aircraft needed), Operational or inherent availability
(maintenance times, failure rates), Capability
(component weights, fuel requirement), and
Survivability (low observable geometry, coatings,
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electronic warfare equipment).  These couplings are
captured by the fact that each term influencing LCC is
also represented in the OEC.  Thus, for example, the
"price" of a high attrition rate will be felt in the
procurement cost and the cost of a stealthy design will
appear in the development and procurement costs.
    Mission     Capability   
  Mission Capability is a measure of an
aircraft’s ability to complete its mission (satisfy or
exceed all mission requirements).  Unlike affordability,
where a widely accepted metric (LCC) exists for
comparison purposes, the mission capability area lacks
such a comprehensive metric.  Therefore, a somewhat
"artificial" one needs to be created.  Given a baseline set
of mission requirements and assumptions, the
performance of various configurations can be compared
through a Mission Capability Index (MCI).  The
capability of a multirole aircraft consists, at a
fundamental level, of two types of performance
requirements: air-to-air and air-to-ground.  The MCI,
then, consists of two terms: the Performance Index (PI)
and excess Power (Ps).  The PI is a function of payload,
range, empty weight, and fuel weight.  Thus, the PI can
be viewed as a measure of air-to-ground capability, i.e.
how much payload can be delivered to a target, and what
effect such capability has on the overall weight and size





The Ps is the Specific Excess Power, which is a
function of available thrust, total drag, flight speed, and
the weight and is measured at specified Mach number,
altitude combinations.  The expression for Ps is shown
below in Equation (4).    
Ps =
T − D( )V∞
W
(4)
Ps can be viewed as a measure of energy available to the
aircraft to perform a maneuver.  A positive Ps implies
energy is available to tighten turns, climb, or accelerate.
On the other hand, negative Ps implies an energy loss
to decelerate, dive, or slow in a turn.  Finally, a Ps
equal to zero means that the point of maximum
sustained turn or sustained level flight (T=D) is reached.   
For calculations leading to the inclusion in the OEC,
Ps should be measured at the critical performance
points.  Its relation to accelerations, turn rates, etc.
makes Ps a good measure of air-to-air capability.
As depicted in Equation (5), the MCI contains
weightings on the air-to-ground and air-to-air terms,
achieved through the use of the constant k.  The k factor
ranges between zero and one, where a large value of k
stresses the air-to-ground aspect of capability and a low
value of k stresses the air-to-air aspect.  If k is set to
zero, then the aircraft is considered to be a pure air-to-air
fighter, while when k is set to one, the process yields a
pure strike or air-to-ground vehicle.  This k factor can
be assigned based on the mission design requirements
(i.e. k > (1-k) for a multirole strike aircraft and k < (1-
k) for a fighter / interceptor).
MCI = k PI
PIBL
+ 1 − k( ) Ps
PsBL
           (5)
    Operational    Safety   
Operational Safety is the third component in
the OEC, and in many ways is one of the most difficult
to evaluate.  By nature, any study of safety is reduced to
an exercise in the investigation and analysis of
historical data.  However, whatever inferences are drawn
from the data can and will influence the outcome.
Further, in the real region of interest (i.e. wartime), the
sample data population is small and imprecise,
especially for modern military aircraft, and is heavily
dependent on threat scenario / circumstances making it
extremely hard to uniformly assess or quantify.
There are several key operational safety
definitions that need to be identified preceding the safety
analysis.  According to the terminology used by the
safety community, an incident  is any occurrence which
leads to an unsafe or potentially unsafe situation.
Incidents, or mishaps, which result in damage or injury
are classified according to the severity of the occurrence.
There are three levels of severity: Class-A, Class-B, and
Class-C.   
A Class-A mishap is an occurrence in which
there is loss of life, the aircraft is destroyed, or the total
damage to the aircraft exceeds one million dollars.  A
Class-B mishap is an incident in which there is a severe
injury or the total damage to the aircraft exceeds
$250,000 dollars but is less than one million dollars.
Class-C mishaps are the least severe and occur when
there is a minor injury or the total damage to the aircraft
is less than $250,000 dollars.  Figure 3 depicts the
relative number of mishaps that occur for every one
Class-A occurrence.  For example, for every Class-A









Figure 3:  Relationship of the Occurrence of
Incidents and Mishaps
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The Class-A mishap category is widely used and is the
same for both  the U.S. Air Force and Navy.  In
contrast, the definition of the other two classes has
changed with time, or is different between services.  
The frequency of these accidents are generally
defined in terms of mishap rates, which are defined as
the number of mishaps occurring within a given
number of flight hours.  The worst mishap rates for
aircraft occur in the first few thousand flight hours.
After this infancy period, inherent design problems are
discovered and corrected, and both the operators and the
maintainers become better acquainted with the aircraft
and its sub-systems.  Thus, as flight hours build up, the
system is said to mature.  It is generally accepted that
an aircraft reaches maturity after 1 million fleet
cumulative flight hours.  
Returning to the key definitions, two critical
ones are attrition and engine caused attrition.  Attrition
is defined as the loss of an aircraft, which translates into
a reduced capability to advance mission objectives and
possibly loss of life Attrition is expressed in terms of
losses per 100,000 flight hours, and its calculation is as
follows:






•  Flight Hours (6)
Since the majority of Class-A mishaps are
destroyed aircraft, and both services have the same
definition for Class-A, use of this group of incidents
yields consistent results.  Often, however, the exact
details of the cause of a wartime Class-A mishap are
simply unavailable. It is for this reason that a safety
evaluation analysis may have to be based on peacetime
attrition data.  In this setting, the Engine-caused
Attrition Index (EAI), as illustrated in Equation (7),
presents a means of estimating the effect on peacetime
attrition of engine induced Class-A failures based on the
total number of aircraft operated.  In terms of peacetime
safety concerns, engine related causes dominate the
attrition profile; thus the EAI is appropriate.
   EAI = #  A / C Procured -  #  Engine Caused Attrition A / C
#  A / C Procured
    (7)
 
This index is a function of the number of
aircraft procured and the number of aircraft lost due to
engine causes.  Engine-caused mishaps are incidents
where primary failure was solely initiated and chargeable
to the engine or its components.  From an engine
attrition point of view, the higher the EAI value, the
safer the system.  This category does not include engine
failures due to improper maintenance or operation.   
Though tempting, it is quite dangerous to
blindly collect what seems to be appropriate data for use
in calculating a safety metric such as the EAI.
Historical safety data can quite easily be misused to
support one’s point of view.  The existence of a
multitude of possible causes for attrition as well as the
frequent difficulty in discerning the cause of a Class-A
mishap contributes to the confusion.  In order to
understand this "confusion", one needs to examine the
factors that generally influence attrition and explore the
nature of mishaps with the hope of computing an
accurate EAI.  
Mishaps can be viewed as a function of the
following attributes:
•  Technology Level  Year of Introduction
Measured by
•  Maturity  Total hours flown
Which translates to
•  Operational Env.  Land vs. Carrier
•  Mission Type  Strike, Air-Air, Bomber
•  Mission Scenario  Night, Day; Low, High
•  Crew Size  One vs. two pilot crew
•  Commonalty  airframe, engine
•  Engine Number  Single Vs. Twin
Therefore, an objective comparison of configurations
with respect to one attribute, for example operational
environment, can only be made when all causes of
variability are removed from the data gathered.  If
possible, the effect of operational environment must be
isolated to allow the proper assessment of data based
upon a common mission type, crew size, and number of
engines.  The more difficult task is discerning the
fashion in which technology level and maturity level
can be addressed and consequently normalized.  For
comparison of future concepts, though, the Class-A
engine related mishap rates used in computing the EAI
must be based on a projection of engine technology
improvement.
   Survivability   
Survivability can be broadly defined as a
measure of an aircraft's ability to evade detection and
avoid damage which would result in loss of vehicle.  A
complete assessment requires a multivariable functional
analysis over the spread of possible missions and
threats, as described by R. E. Ball in The Fundamentals
of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design,
published by the AIAA.  As shown in Figure 4, this
procedure leads to the computation of a Survivability
Index.  
To quantify Survivability, the probabilities of
being detected, hit if detected, and killed if hit must be
6
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considered.  The aircraft's probability of survival, Psurv,
can be divided into two parts, susceptibility and
vulnerability.  Susceptibility is the product of the
probability of detection PD and the probability of being
hit if detected PH/D.  Vulnerability, on the other hand,
is the probability of being killed if hit PK/H.  The
product of these probabilities is subtracted from one to
give the Probability of Survival, Psurv, shown in
Equation (8).  
Psurv = 1 − PD ⋅ PH D ⋅ PK H( )[ ] (8)
where PD = Probability of detection
 PH/D = Probability of being hit if detected





























Figure 4:  Flow Chart for Survivability Analysis
The individual constituents of the Psurv
expression are determined mainly through such
measures as radar cross-section, infrared signature, and
electronic counter-measures effectiveness.  Changes in
aircraft configuration, such as the decision to use one
engine or two, enter into the model of combat
survivability assessment, along with such items as
mission profiles and threat information.  The estimated
aircraft signature and the mission profiles allow
survivability evaluation using estimates for probability
of detection and the conditional probabilities of being
hit if detected and of being killed if hit. Combat
survivability also requires appropriate models for threat
sensors, countermeasures, weapons systems, and aircraft
vulnerability.  The probability of survival can be
calculated for a number of postulated mission profiles,
and the overall survivability index is calculated from the
span of probabilities of survival for different missions
and different aircraft configurations.
    Operational     Readiness   
Operational Readiness measures the amount of
time a weapon system is ready and capable to perform
the mission or function for which it was organized or
designed.  Military aircraft reliability is critically
important to weapon system effectiveness, especially as
seen through two commodities:  time and money.  An
unreliable aircraft that is not mission capable for a wing
commander, when he needs it, is not an asset to him
regardless of performance or cost.  Furthermore, this
unreliable aircraft consumes resources, time, money,
and manpower in order to provide support for repairs.
Thus, reliability is directly linked to support costs,
operational readiness, and availability.  In fact, there is
an equivalency between reliability and readiness or
availability.  Reliability is a design objective while
availability is an operational objective.  Operational
availability can be viewed as a subset of operational
readiness, since a commander can rearrange his assets
(aircraft, crew, etc.) in such a fashion as to maintain
high operational readiness levels although his
operational availability may not be as good.  
Operational availability, Ao is commonly
defined as:
The long term steady-state availability of a system or
equipment operating in its usual environment and
performing required missions or functions. 5
Mathematically, the operational availability is a
function of the Mean Time Between Downing Events
(MTBDE) and the Mean Time To Restore a System
(MTTRS).  The relationship between them is:
Ao = MTBDEMTBDE + MTTRS
(9)
MTBDE represents the mean time between maintenance
actions and ready time.  MTTRS includes active
maintenance time (MMH/FH) at the Organizational
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(‘O’) level and at the Intermediate (‘I’) level, as well as
the waiting (or pipeline) times for spares to arrive.  The
definitions above come from Reference 5.
Although operational availability is an
appropriate metric for reliability, its definition includes,
in addition to preventive and corrective maintenance,
logistics and administrative downtime.  These latter two
aspects are hard to quantify, and in reality, have nothing
to do with respect to how reliable the product is.  In the
limiting case, where the pipeline times and preventive
maintenance are not considered, the operational
availability reduces to the Inherent Availability.
The most common definition of inherent
availability is:
A measure of the degree to which an item is in the
operable and committal state at the start of the mission
when the mission is called for, at an unknown time. 5
Inherent availability differs from operational availability
in that the former is a function of design related (or
corrective) maintenance issues, whereas the latter
represents both corrective and preventive maintenance.
The evaluation of inherent availability consists of
system differences in terms of reliability and
maintainability.  The equation for inherent availability
is, thus, a function of the Mean Time Between Failure
[MTBF (reliability)] and the Mean Time To Repair
[MTTR (maintainability)] and does not encompass
stockouts, administrative delays, and preventive
maintenance.  The equation for calculating the inherent





Both the MTBF and MTTR represent the time element
of readiness, which is an important factor for wing
commanders concerned about the amount of time their
assets are ready to perform.  For new concepts, such
data can be carefully inferred from data on modern
aircraft of similar type.  The money aspect, measured in
terms of maintenance man hours per flight hour
(MMH/FH), is captured directly in the support part of
the Life Cycle Cost analysis.  
The expression for the OEC is now completely
defined in terms of the attribute metrics.  The five
metrics appearing in Equation (11) represent the relative
performance of competing configurations.  Each of
them has been introduced in the preceding paragraphs
and are summarized in Table 2.1.  The individual
metrics are normalized by baseline values so that each
term in the OEC is non-dimensional, thus avoiding the
pitfall of "adding apples and oranges".  Through this
OEC, aspects previously unaccounted for in earlier
studies are considered through definable and traceable
metrics.  This ensures a comprehensive assessment
where direct, meaningful comparisons of competing
alternatives are possible.  The details of attribute metric
calculations depend on the type of aircraft, the analysis
tools available, and the level of sophistication desired.
A generic way to approach these calculations is
presented next.


































Life Cycle Mission Engine Survivability Inherent
        Cost Capability Related Availability
Index Attrition
         Index
Table 2.1.  Overall Evaluation Criteria Term Definitions
Attribute Metric Expression
Affordability LCC LCC=RDTE+Procurement+Operations and Support
Mission Capability MCI MCI=k*PI+(1-k)Ps
Operational
Safety
EAI EAI = #  A / C Procured -  #  Engine Caused Attrition A / C
#  A / C Procured





    Recomposition:  Generate the Alternatives   
Once appropriate metrics have been selected
and the objective formulated, how does one approach
calculating them concurrently?  At Georgia Tech, a
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method has been constructed to do this, and can best be
seen as a recomposition process employed once the
various parts of the problem have been broken down and
analyzed.  In order to do this recomposition in an
intelligent way, Product and  Process design variables
and constraints must be considered simultaneously.
Product characteristics are those that pertain directly to
the subject of design, such as geometry, materials,
propulsion systems, etc.  Process characteristics, on the
other hand, refer to those items related to how a product
is designed, produced, and sustained over its lifetime.
At Georgia Tech, these different yet closely coupled
characteristics are combined in the form of an Integrated
Product and Process Design (IPPD) approach.  This
approach to weapon system evaluation takes the form of
a "Funnel", as illustrated in Figure 5.  In essence, the
Funnel represents a concurrent recomposition process in
which the various disciplinary interactions are accounted
for during "synthesis", or recomposition. The Funnel
shown in the figure would be used to evaluate existing
configurations.  For the evaluation and optimization of
totally new concepts, the Discipline Level in the figure
would contain actual design variables such as wing area,
span, aspect ratio for aerodynamics, number of spars and
ribs and percent composites for structures, etc., instead
of the broader configuration characteristics shown.  
Aero / Perf Structures Propulsion Survivability Producibility Supportability
• Configuration.
       geometry            
   • Variable W/S, S
     • High-lift devices
       • Tail sized for S/C
         • Control Surfaces
• Configuration
    internal struct.
  • Carrier capable?
   (Full length keel)
    • Material 
Selection
• Engine number
 • Cycle definition
  • SEROC for twins
   • Inlets / Nozzles
     • Signature
penalties
 •Configuration geom.
      characteristics            
 • Active measures
 • No straight 
    exhausts or inlets
 • Threat environ-
ment
C  O  N  S  T  R  A  I  N  T  S
• Range
 • L/D (takeoff,
     landing, cruise)
    • Accel. rates
      • Excess power
        • Apprc. Speed
• ∆ Weights
 • ∆ CG
  • Land or Sea
      derivatives
• T/W
 • Engine Wt
  • SFC
   • Installed 




   • Internal geometry
       identification
  • Composite mater.
 • Single production    
          line
• Part, component
    commonality
    • 2-level maintenance
   • redundant systems




         Cost
• Lean manufa-
      cturing            
   • MTBMa















OEC=LCC + MCI + EAI + Psurv + Ai




Integrated Product and Process Design Approach
Product Process
Figure 5:  An IPPD Approach to Weapon System Evaluation
In any case, at the Integrated Design Level,
Discipline Level information is used to perform system
synthesis (with appropriate constraints).  What is thus
obtained are the various sub-metrics needed to calculate
the OEC-level metrics for a given configuration.  A
similar procedure also takes place on the process side of
the funnel, labeled as Producibility and Supportability.
Through a recomposition of these disciplines, the
system metrics for affordability, capability, and
survivability are computed.  With the inclusion of the
safety and reliability data obtained through an analogy
of historical data, the ultimate objective, the OEC, can
be calculated.  Since some of the computations for these
last two attributes involve only analyses of historical
data, much of the analysis related to them can be
performed concurrently with the vehicle sizing and cost
estimating tasks.  
The IPPD approach in Figure 5, coupled with
the multi-function OEC of Equation (11), can be
utilized in two ways.  For the evaluation of existing or
derivative concepts, the methodology can be used as an
inclusive, flexible assessment technique.  If desired,
however, the methodology can be extended to include
the generation, evaluation, and optimization of totally
new aircraft concepts based on a certain set of design
requirements.  Such a process has been developed by the
ASDL for commercial sub- and supersonic transports.  
   Problem Closure:
   Evaluation via  the OEC Decision Matrix   
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The approach described in this paper attempts
to retain as much decision freedom for the designer and
customer for as long as possible.  Ultimately, however,
decisions must be made.  Given the results for each of
the areas investigated (affordability, capability,
operational safety, survivability, and operational
readiness), one would like to know which of, say
Aircraft A and Aircraft B, is the better vehicle.  Figure 6
illustrates that, if the choice was made in isolation, the
answer to this question could be A, B, or inconclusive.
This uncertainty is due to the lack of knowledge about
the magnitude of the superiorities (how much better is
A over B for Affordability) as well as the importance of
the attribute (how important is Affordability to the
overall objective).
If the Choice Was Made in “Isolation” ...
   Choice
Affordability: Aircraft A
Capability: Aircraft A
Operational Safety: Aircraft B
Survivability: Aircraft B
Operational Readiness: Aircraft A
   
     -------------------
How to Decide    ??
An Example
Figure 6:  Isolated Design Decision Making
An alternative perspective to compare the
Aircrafts A and B is obtained via the "Spider Chart"
depicted in Figure 7.  The values along the inner ring
represent minimum acceptable values for that particular
characteristic.  Here, Aircraft A represents the baseline,
since it takes a value of one for all of the measures.
Aircraft B is then placed relative to that baseline. The
outer ring represents normalized target, or ideal, values
























































































































Figure 7:  The "Spider Chart" View of System Evaluation
In other words, the better aircraft for each
attribute "slice" will be to the outside of its counterpart.
With these definitions in mind, Figure 7 exhibits in a
graphical way the fact that our ficticious Aircraft A
exceeds configuration B in all but four attributes, since
it lies "outside" of Aircraft B the majority of the time.   
The "Spider Chart" can also show qualitative
relationships between related characteristics.  Figure 6,
for example, shows an almost even exchange in the
probability of detection, with Aircraft A having just
about as much of a percentage advantage in IR signature
as it does a disadvantage in RCS.  Note that all of these
results agree with the "isolated" conclusions concerning
the five attributes in Figure 5.  But the "Spider Chart"
10
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comes closer to capturing the entire system evaluation
problem.  The question remains, though, what if certain
attributes were of higher importance to the evaluator or
crucially important in the selection of a particular type
of weapon system?  Here, the "Spider Chart" fails and
an alternative is again needed.
This shortcoming points in a direct way to the
conclusion that the most effective and comprehensive
way to evaluate the alternatives is through a     well-  
  formulated     criteria    function,    in    this     case    the      Overall
   Evaluation     Criterion   (OEC)  .  As mentioned previously,
any system evaluation result is a function of two
elements: the system itself and the perspective of the
individual or organizational evaluator.  Therefore, the
results for each of the five attributes comprising the
OEC developed earlier are used to construct a matrix of
resulting OEC values, consisting of various
combinations of the attribute importance coefficients.
Various sets of weighting combinations can be selected
and collected in a matrix format to provide the customer
with a visual means of discerning between alternative
configurations.  Figure 8 illustrates the format of such





















Note:  Baseline aircraft OEC = 1
Figure 8:  Evaluation Matrix Format
In this example OEC matrix, the five attribute
metrics are shown along with their appropriate
importance coefficients.  For example, α1, α2, and α3
represent three different values for the importance
coefficient for LCC, or Affordability.  Immediately, it
is seen that not every entry in the matrix will be
populated since not all of the α, β, γ, δ, and ε
combinations sum to one.   For those combination
which do make sense, a ratio appears in the box.  The
baseline values in the OEC (Equation (11)) correspond
to the baseline aircraft whose OEC is always equal to
one.  Thus, returning to our example, if a comparison
was desired Aircrafts A and B, Aircraft A could be
considered the baseline and thus have its OEC equal to
one.  The OEC for Aircraft B, then, is calculated and
entered into the appropriate cell of the matrix.  If this
number is greater than one, then the configuration B is
a better overall configuration than its counterpart, for
those particular choices of importance coefficients.
Likewise, if the value entered is less than one, the
Aircraft A is the better choice.  In this way, an
evaluator can quickly determine which aircraft is better
for the given weighted objective function.  Note that the
attribute metrics themselves are constant throughout the
matrix; it is only the coefficients which are changing.
    A Summary   
The three steps to concept selection described
above (decomposition, recomposition, evaluation) are
summarized in the Methodology Flow Diagram in
Figure 9.  The flow diagram maps the activities
required, as well as the tools needed, to compute the
required five attribute metrics.  The sequence of events
illustrated in Figure 9 represents the heart of the
integrated approach to military aircraft selection and
concept evaluation put forward in this paper.  In
summary, then, the first stage in the implementation
consists of assessing the customer's needs and
requirements (voice of the customer) and translating
them into a series of objectives.  This type of activity
was illustrated in the Weapon System Effectiveness
Breakdown of Figure 1.  If the customer goals are broad,
this decomposition process helps clarify the objectives
and focus them through the creation of the OEC
concept.   
11
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics











• Customer Needs Flow Down
• Decompose System
• Establish Value Objective








































Figure 9:  Methodology Flow Diagram
The second stage, termed "Generate Feasible
Alternatives", is where the required metrics identified in
the previous stage are calculated.  The four main blocks
of this stage, each representing a critical task, are the
means by which the mission capability metric, MCI,
and the Life Cycle Cost, LCC, are computed.  The
process begins, as with any design or analysis problem,
with the definitions of all key requirements to be met.
Subsequently, the powerplant performance is either
specified externally or generated based and performance
requirements.  Subject to all appropriate constraints, the
component weights of the aircraft generated by the
sizing code are provided to the affordability analysis.
Following this sequence of events, the MCI and the
LCC are calculated, and the information is passed to the
overall evaluation criterion.  Finally, the availability,
operational safety, and survivability metrics are
calculated, concurrently where possible.  
The final stage in the execution of the
methodology is the Evaluation of Alternatives stage.
Here, various combinations of the importance
coefficients are considered resulting in a so-called OEC
Decision Matrix.  
    Conclusion   
The methodology developed and presented here
represents an advancement in military aircraft design
evaluation for two reasons.  First, previous approaches
concentrated mainly on narrow technology-cost
tradeoffs.  The approach presented here, in contrast, is a
comprehensive way of addressing each of the five most
important attributes of a military aircraft, not in
isolation, but through an inclusive Overall Evaluation
Criterion (OEC).  These five attributes, as seen above,
are Affordability, Capability, Operational Safety,
Survivability, and Readiness.  Second, this structured
approach results in a series of outcomes which depend
on the needs and/or preferences of the customer.  Rarely
are configuration choices clear cut, especially since
subjective inputs are an inherent part of the decision
making process.   This Georgia Tech approach contains
a built-in mechanism for such inputs in the OEC
through what are called attribute importance
coefficients.  These coefficients are explicit entry points
for the "voice of the customer," so that he may indicate
his preferred importance weighting for air-to-ground
capability, safety, affordability, etc. Once these
weightings are chosen, a meaningful evaluation of
alternative concepts can be made through comparisons
of the non-dimensional OECs via an Evaluation Matrix,
ultimately leading to the decision required.
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